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Abstract 
 This thesis proposes a rethinking of mental health interventions in developing 
countries by examining policies that took place in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami in Sri Lanka, using anthropological concepts influenced by phenomenology such 
as the notion of embodiment. Contestations regarding the Cartesian mind-body duality 
have led to various methods of understanding the human being, with materialist 
biomedicine dominating Western psychiatry due to its scientific ‘rigour.’ However, 
Western psychiatry’s universalist assumptions – a one-size-fits-all understanding of 
mental anguish – have failed to achieve its objectives, particularly in non-Western settings. 
This is because such policies thus far have maintained a biomedicine-centric stance that 
pathologises mental suffering, with little room for integrating local perspectives. In order 
to rectify mistakes, mental health professionals must understand how sufferers of mental 
distress process phenomena beyond solely biomedical or culturalist frames, focusing 
instead on the experience itself that incorporates both sides of the spectrum when 
necessary. I further argue that by reconsidering the meaning of experience and 
participation in everyday life, its conclusions can be applied to participatory development. 
This can take place through working together with the sufferers by encouraging their 
participation in formulating mental health programmes and listening to them with 
empathy, to find suitable emic-etic frameworks. Through promoting collaborative mental 
health policies as a citizenship right, the issue of ‘political will’ is also challenged through 
local community mobilisation, while re-defining the meaning of ‘participation’ during 
the process. 
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Introduction 
 
Mental health in developing countries is an issue that has been receiving 
increasing attention in the early 21st Century. There is already a large body of literature 
that critiques the homogeneous, ‘technical’ nature of development policy; despite its 
claims of being apolitical, such initiatives do indeed have political effects (Ferguson 1994; 
Li 2007). Developing countries’ mental health policies on the other hand, is a relatively 
new area of enquiry. Starting with the creation of ‘humanitarian psychiatry’ from the 
Armenian earthquake of 1988, mental health has been discussed and targeted by 
development agencies with increasing attention through initiatives such as the Movement 
for Global Mental Health (MGMH) (Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Lancet Global Mental 
Health Group 2007). Although mental health was not explicitly addressed through 
multilateral initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), its 
importance on improving health inequalities between developing and developed countries 
has been recognised (Sachs and Sachs 2007). Triggered by a series of articles on The 
Lancet in 2007 and 2011 by Vikram Patel and his colleagues, psychiatrists have called 
for ‘scaling up’ mental health and facilities in developing countries, arguing that there is 
‘no health without mental health’ (Lancet Global Mental Health Group 2007; Gostin 
2012). As developed countries themselves start to recognise long-term issues surrounding 
mental health, concerns in developing countries have also increased (Chambers 2010; 
McEachran 2013). From the late 1980s, mental health has been a steadily growing issue 
in the development discourse, to the extent where it is having its own variant of the MDGs 
in the MGMH.  
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There has been a growing body of literature on mental health policy in developing 
countries, focusing in particular on the MGMH and its implications. Academics such as 
Vikram Patel (Lancet Global Mental Health Group 2007) and Arthur Kleinman (2009) 
emphasise MGMH’s collaborative potential towards working with, not for, health 
professionals in developing countries towards addressing mental anguish. On the other 
hand, academics against the MGMH include Mills (2013, 2014), Moncrieff (2009) and 
Summerfield (2012), whose works focus on the impact of promulgating Western 
psychiatry’s biomedical, materialist understanding of mental anguish, in spite of the 
discipline’s epistemological foundations being questioned in the global North. Moncrieff 
(2007) and Mills (2014) in particular have been critical of MGMH and its relationship 
with pharmaceutical companies, as dependency on pharmaceuticals grows by 
promulgating a medicalised understanding of mental health; Mills’ (2014) examination 
of farmer suicides in India exemplify such situations. Fernando (2012) and Campbell and 
Burgess (2012) adopt a more nuanced approach by criticising what has been hitherto a 
biomedicine-centric understanding towards mental anguish, while acknowledging that 
frameworks such as the MGMH will provide greater public awareness towards mental 
health issues in developing countries. Both articles stress the importance of collaboration 
regarding mental health policy between its practitioners and local communities, focusing 
in particular on understanding how communities define mental anguish and ensuring 
interventions are culturally sensitive. However, neither article explicitly discusses how 
such processes can take place without them transforming into one-sided, paternalistic 
7 
 
procedures, akin to the excessively malleable nature of participatory development that 
has been critiqued by many1.  
In response, I propose a different way to examine mental health interventions in 
developing countries by ‘blurring’ the Cartesian mind-body duality and discussing what 
participatory development can do to improve present and future mental health initiatives. 
How has the current paradigm on mental health in developing countries enabled mental 
health and development practitioners to design their policies in such fashion? Given its 
features, how can we reconfigure this paradigm to improve the status quo? This thesis 
first examines the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami and its implications for various Sri Lankan 
communities, using ethnographic evidence gathered by humanitarian workers, 
psychologists and psychiatrists, while providing context on Sri Lankan socio-cultural 
values on trauma and expressing mental distress. The second chapter evaluates the 
Cartesian duality and its validity in a Sri Lankan context by unpacking the case study 
material and examining the role of embodiment and experience regarding psychiatric 
interventions. The third chapter discusses finding ways to redefine ‘participation’ by 
grounding local-level projects with overarching reforms focused on greater political 
involvement. More precisely, I will merge what Campbell and Burgess (2012), Fernando 
(2012), Gaventa (2004) and Hickey and Mohan (2005) have discussed on mental health 
policies and participatory development, as the four articles’ concepts are complementary 
to one another. By combining psychiatry, phenomenologically-informed concepts of the 
body and participatory development together, a different perspective is created from 
                                                          
1 Due to the large quantity of literature regarding the downfalls of participatory development, I will only 
list some articles and book chapters: Blanchet (2001); Kothari (2001); Mohan and Stokke (2000); Mosse 
(1994, 2001). 
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merging the “Three Ps.” Through examining the Cartesian duality and how people 
encounter phenomena and process them as experiences and/or embodiments, perhaps 
development and mental health practitioners will be able to learn from past treatment 
policies in developing countries and adopt more inclusive, holistic approaches towards 
helping the mentally anguished by encouraging them to express their experiences without 
prejudice. 
Chapter 1 examines mental health interventions that took place in Sri Lanka after 
the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami to demonstrate how aid agencies’ one-size-fits-all approach 
towards mental health did not achieve desired outcomes. Instead of a homogeneous, 
universalist response to the tsunami, the heterogeneity found in survivors’ coping and 
processing mechanisms demonstrated that the trauma-resilience dichotomy was not as 
discrete as psychiatrists and aid workers had anticipated (Fernando 2005, 2008; Ganesan 
2006; Tribe 2007). For instance, the survivors’ diverse perspectives suggested that some 
have used the event as a source of motivation, while others were suffering from trauma 
that had already been worsened by then-ongoing Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict (Rajkumar, 
Premkumar and Tharyan 2008; Lawrence 2010). Many Western mental health 
professionals assumed that all the survivors were traumatised, but this in fact proved to 
be false. This contrast between how an external party envisions a situation to be for 
participants and how they processed said situation shows the narrow, specific ways in 
which Western psychiatry has come to understand the human mind in other socio-cultural 
settings.  Through integrating local values on mental distress in aid policies, perhaps this 
lens can be broadened to take into account necessary factors that were hitherto de-
emphasised.  
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Given the narrow psychiatric perspective through which mental health 
interventions take place, Chapter 2 will question and ‘blur’ the Cartesian duality. I 
approach the problem of universalist discourses in psychiatry by discussing embodiment 
and the anthropology of experience to show the mind-body distinction is not as rigid as 
expected. This leaves two key questions to answer: the first one concerns the Cartesian 
mind-body duality, where the two entities are distinct and separate from one another, an 
assumption that has been kept largely intact in modern biomedicine (Horwitz 2002). 
While its intentions were to separate science from religious interference, its psychiatric 
applications do not always answer the questions that are needed (Csordas 1994). The 
notion of embodiment argues that the body is not a ‘neutral’ entity but a part of the 
processes through which a person experiences a given incident or process via their body 
(Desjarlais and Throop 2011). Put succinctly, embodiment explains how the human being 
senses and guides him/herself in their surroundings, leading to experiences (Aho 2008). 
The question of how a local audience perceives their experience of Western psychiatric 
and psychosocial interventions often varies between different communities. However, 
mental health professionals have remained adamant about their understanding of human 
anguish being globally accepted. As a result, Chapter 2 argues for a more holistic 
approach towards how people process and experience mental discomfort by challenging 
the Cartesian duality in Sri Lankan socio-cultural contexts.  
Reconsidering the meaning of participation and inclusiveness can provide 
different perspectives on participatory development, an oft-derided initiative; this is what 
Chapter 3 will discuss. The second issue stemming from approaching psychiatry in 
developing countries from embodied and experiential perspectives is the exclusion of 
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people mental health professionals are trying to assist in the policymaking process. 
Finding parallels to problems associated with universalist discourses of psychiatry, many 
participatory development projects considered ‘participation’ as a panacea without 
considering how its processes occur. Given the various labels associated with 
participatory development – such as ‘tyrannical’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001) and a 
‘buzzword’ simultaneously full and devoid of meaning (Cornwall and Brock 2005; 
McKinnon 2007) – a reconfiguration of its processes is needed. In instances of natural 
disasters or conflict, humanitarian aid workers have frequently assumed that they were 
equipped with sufficient knowledge to aid the survivors, with little consideration of local 
perspectives and needs (Pupavac 2002; Rajaram 2002). In response, by considering 
participation as a right derived from citizenship, participatory development becomes 
politicised from the grassroots, promoting political engagement to a wider audience and 
enabling communities to start engaging with policymakers (Hickey and Mohan 2005). 
Open, bilateral discussions are therefore needed to clearly define participation and its 
implications, ensuring that both development practitioners and local communities are able 
to exchange ideas as equals.  
Merging the two ruptures together, mental health facilities are one area where 
participatory development can and ought to play a role. This is because mental distress is 
often difficult to be categorised. However, without having well-defined criteria with 
which to evaluate patients, identifying causes of mental distress is not easy, thus creating 
difficulties in finding a starting point for analysis (Csordas 1994). At the same time, 
Western psychiatry’s preference for the Cartesian duality and biomedicine-centric 
analysis makes diagnoses of mental distress in developing countries difficult, due to the 
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ambivalent nature between the ‘mind’ and the ‘body’ across various socio-cultural 
contexts (Horwitz 2002). Therefore, asking local people suffering from a certain form of 
mental discomfort to explain their symptoms in a method that is culturally appropriate 
and then integrating this knowledge into Western pathological methods – an integrated 
emic-etic framework – can serve as a way of blending local knowledge with technical 
assistance (Fernando 2004, 2008; Tribe 2007). Put succinctly, development agencies have 
hitherto mirrored Western psychiatry’s materialist stance by rendering technical – or in 
psychiatry’s case, ‘objective’ and scientific – something that has a significantly subjective 
component: mental health. The healing process then becomes devoid of emotion, 
empathy and personal experience, despite humanitarian and development agency rhetoric 
suggesting otherwise. Even though mental distress could have affective and socio-cultural 
elements that cannot be answered through biomedicine and biological reasoning, 
development practitioners’ insistence on Western grounds of rationality and mental health 
is likely to lead to misdiagnoses and unintended outcomes.  
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Chapter 1 – 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami: Interventions gone wrong 
 On December 26th 2004, countries in the Indian Ocean area were struck by a 
tsunami triggered by an underwater earthquake of magnitude 9.0, which killed 
approximately 35,000 people in 30 minutes; in comparison, the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-Sri Lankan government conflict over 20 years took 65,000 lives 
(Sarvananthan 2007:1). Furthermore, given the cultural significance of the time period – 
the full moon poya day – many Sri Lankans including the President were in transit when 
the tsunami struck, placing the country in chaos (Stirrat 2006:12). This chapter explains 
and discusses the varied responses to the tsunami shown by the survivors and field 
workers (psychiatrists, psychologists and humanitarian workers) to establish the case 
study examined in the thesis. It also argues that mental health interventions implemented 
during the post-recovery process in Sri Lanka and India failed to achieve their self-defined 
objectives, thereby questioning the effectiveness of psychiatric interventions in 
developing countries. Despite the good intentions of relief workers, overzealous funding, 
lack of co-ordinated action and overwhelming expectations mounted by the media on aid 
agencies caused problems. Without taking into account socio-cultural values and ongoing 
trauma from the Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic conflict, most mental health professionals who 
arrived in Sri Lanka adopted homogenous stances towards treating the traumatised. In 
doing so, what was already a disorganised relief initiative had become even more 
convoluted. 
The Tsunami and its Consequences 
 The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami brought about deaths, destruction of livelihoods 
and infrastructure and plight upon various communities. For the survivors, having to flee 
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and abandon their homes brought about concerns regarding safety, access of resources 
and ensuring their families stayed together. In India, more than 12,400 deaths were 
reported, with most of the casualties coming from Tamil Nadu (Rajkumar, Premkuar and 
Tharyan 2008). More than 31,000 Sri Lankans were reported to have died as of February 
2005, with a further 7,000 declared missing and at least 440,000 people being displaced 
(Yamada et al 2006).  In the Aceh province of Indonesia, at least 130,000 people died, 
with possibly more unreported deaths with the worldwide death toll from the tsunami 
estimated at 280,000 (Irmansyah et al 2010:2). Over 200 organisations arrived to help the 
survivors, many of whom suffered from a lack of housing, food and were simultaneously 
exposed to somatic and mental illnesses (WHO 2005). Given the large-scale displacement 
of people, casualties, injuries and destroyed infrastructure, many South Asians were left 
with dead or missing family members and little of their livelihoods left unscathed after 
the tsunami. Furthermore, the geographical spread and number of organisations arriving 
into tsunami-affected areas posed problems in terms of mobilising human resources and 
addressing the various needs of survivors. 
 Focusing specifically on Sri Lanka, the tsunami affected all 14 coastal districts in 
the country. The estimated cost of direct physical damages from the tsunami was US $1 
billion with $1.5 billion needed to repair said damage. From the cost of direct damages, 
private property damage was approximately $700 million, thus representing 70% of the 
total cost. Indirect losses such as reduced tourism industry and fisheries were estimated 
to be $250 million and $100 million respectively (ADB/JBIC/JICA/WB 2005: cited in 
Sarvananthan 2007:21). The eastern coastal regions such as Batticaloa, Ampara and 
Trincomalee were affected the most due to their proximity to Sumatra. Coincidentally, 
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Batticaloa has a Tamil majority, whereas Ampara has a significant Muslim presence; 
significant damage also occurred in Tamil majority northern provincial districts such as 
Jaffna (Kuhn 2010:44-45). The extent and nature of the damages also varied greatly: 
although most of the casualties, environmental and physical damage occurred in eastern 
and southern districts, the northern districts were affected the most economically due to 
a lack of existing infrastructure and economic activity before the tsunami (Sarvananthan 
2007). Furthermore, the ethnic and cultural diversity contributed towards the complex 
nature of damages incurred by Sri Lankan coastal districts ranging from fishermen losing 
their boats, tourist resorts being damaged and religious artefacts and sites being destroyed 
(Lawrence 2010; Stirrat 2006). The tsunami for Sri Lanka posed an immense challenge 
in terms of recovery projects, due to the large variation of not just the damages themselves, 
but the socio-cultural, religious and ethnic composition of regions affected by the tsunami 
making standardised policymaking difficult.  
Sri Lankan Attitudes Towards Mental Distress: Unravelling Years of Trauma 
 Sri Lanka’s history of guerrilla warfare and conflict had already ingrained trauma 
in many people’s lives. From 1983 to 2005, conflict between LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government caused as many as 64,000 deaths, not to mention the fear ingrained in 
families and individuals (Tribe 2007). Combined with additional family loss from the 
tsunami, it was estimated that families will need more than six months to become mentally 
stable again – a threshold suggested by Gray, Maguen and Litz (2004) – who emphasise 
the role of time in helping communities overcome their losses. Fernando’s (2008) creation 
of the Sri Lankan Psychosocial Status – Adult Version (SLIPPS-A) criteria used to 
diagnose adult Sri Lankans’ mental wellbeing reflected the importance of taking past 
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exposures to trauma into consideration. SLIPPS-A was designed to estimate life 
satisfaction based on trauma exposure; those who had been exposed to both ethnic conflict 
and the tsunami had significantly different mean life satisfaction responses compared to 
those who had only been exposed to one or the other source of trauma (Fernando 
2008:236). Akin to Green and Hulme’s (2005) analysis of poverty as a ‘chronic’ temporal 
phenomenon, mental health in areas riddled with prior manmade or natural conflict must 
consider the impact of time, memory and prolonged trauma. It is possible that the families 
of victims are likely to have a compounded sense of anguish and loss in the instance of 
natural disasters and aid workers should take this into account.  
 The Sinhala-Tamil conflict fractured what were generally strong bonds of kinship 
in communities. The LTTE’s recruitment and war strategies were aggressive, with threats 
and violence against both Tamils and Sinhala as their instruments of coercion, while 
martyrising those who have died conducting acts of aggression against government forces 
by building monuments (Daniel 1994; Lawrence 2010). Tamils typically internalise and 
process adverse incidents together as a family to protect each other, focusing in particular 
on children (Nikapota 2006; Somasundaram 2003). However, the then-ongoing war 
brought about ‘disappearances’ of various family members and displacements, which 
reduced family cohesiveness (Lawrence 2007; Somasundaram 2010). In response, certain 
families opted to ‘silence’ themselves to protect one another. If they talked about missing 
kin members, retribution from the LTTE or Sinhala forces could recur, not to mention 
possible relapses into panic attacks (Argenti-Pillen 2003b; Somasundaram 2003, 2010). 
Consequently, Tamils interviewed by Lawrence (2000, 2007) chose to discuss such issues 
in ‘private’ realms, for example religious places or even join the LTTE in search for a 
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‘new’ family. Amman (goddess) oracles held a special position in eastern Sri Lanka 
districts because of their role as envoys for receiving energy and guidance from Ammans, 
connecting with them as one to resolve conflicts, filling the void that the government had 
left for dispute resolutions (Lawrence 2000:180-181). As kinship became increasingly 
fractured from the conflict, many Tamils looked to religion or LTTE activism to replace 
the void, while remaining silent about abductions to protect each other. 
 On the other hand, the ethnic conflicts have seemingly instilled a sense of 
resilience and self-determination in certain communities. Decades of violence and being 
‘silenced’ resulted in a state of ‘collective trauma’ for certain Sri Lankan households and 
individuals, who have lost family members and friends through abductions, torture and 
inter-ethnic conflict (Lawrence 2007; Somasundaram 2010). However, for female 
Udahenagama villagers in southern Sri Lanka, their accounts were primarily 
individualised as they sought retribution against specific perpetrators who had attacked 
their families (Argenti-Pillen 2007). Argenti-Pillen (2003b:162) interviewed a woman 
whose response focused on her new state of ‘fearlessness’ despite initial bouts of anguish 
and distress after losing her husband: 
The insurgents came in the evening, on full moon day… When they abducted [my husband], I 
thought  “Oh Buddha, I don’t know why they take him,” and my heart was in shock. … Then 
when they had cut his neck, I lost consciousness. I stayed right next to him there, the whole 
night, until dawn.  Now I have no fears, I can even walk over a dead body. 
The interviewee was overtaken by equal parts anger and fear, to the extent where she was 
prepared to pursue any intruders and had accepted the prospects of death, but remained 
afraid of leaving her house at night. While this could be interpreted as people denying 
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their fears through bravado, the interviewee did not suffer from any symptoms associated 
with local fear-related illnesses; she was reported to be healthy. She also did not engage 
in rituals to remedy ‘terrified hearts,’ a term used to describe people intimidated by wild, 
violent spirits (Argenti-Pillen 2003b:161-163). In any case, the varied nature of responses 
towards traumatic incidents among similar ethnic, religious and cultural groups makes 
mental health interventions difficult to standardise. For every traumatised community and 
individual, there are likely to be just as many others who have used traumatic incidents 
as a source of resiliency.  
Religion forms a major part of everyday life in Sri Lanka and must be taken into 
account when examining how people respond to violence. While faiths are generally 
affixed to certain ethnicities, this is not always the case; almost all Buddhists are Sinhalese, 
Hinduism is associated with Tamils, Islam with Moors or Malays but Christians are 
Sinhalese or Tamils (Rogers 1994:15). While Sri Lanka has a Buddhist majority in terms 
of religion, the areas Kuhn (2010:44-45) pointed out that were affected most severely by 
the tsunami have a Tamil majority of Hindus and Muslims, with a Christian minority 
(Tambiah 1986). As a result, mental health interventions needed to be quite specific in 
terms of meeting religious needs. For example, the Cartesian mind-body duality and the 
‘one body, one soul’ identity ingrained in Christianity and Islam would not be applicable 
to followers of Hinduism and Buddhism, whose faiths are founded on the notion of 
reincarnation (Fernando 2012; Lawrence 2010). If a significant, tragic incident were to 
occur such as the tsunami, it was understood as ‘karma’ for sins committed in one’s past 
life as shown by Radha, a Tamil survivor of Sri Lankan military torture: 
18 
 
I am really looking forward to my next life. I must have done some terrible things to have deserved 
this horrible suffering. I know that in my next birth, I will have the most wonderful life. This 
knowledge makes me happy (Fernando 2012:396-397).  
 
However, certain Hindus considered suicide to be a sin and thought that God had created 
such a predicament for reasons they needed to discover, suggesting an impetus for 
resilience (Lawrence 2010:95). After the tsunami, work towards restoring religious sites 
of worship also took place in earnest many survivors, irrespective of ethnicity or religion, 
felt compelled to find places of worship in light of family and material losses (Lawrence 
2010). The ambiguous trauma-resilience duality reappears in a religious context, further 
highlighting the importance of culturally sensitive and informed interventions.  
As a result, there was a lack of ‘formal’ facilities to tackle mental distress brought 
about problems when the tsunami struck as Sri Lankan policymakers assumed, explicitly 
or otherwise, such support systems already existed through religious institutions. The lack 
of government and non-government funding towards mental health facilities was clear in 
areas such as Batticaloa, where no psychiatrist had been present from 1980 until 1999. 
Despite a two-year period between 1978 and 1980 where one psychiatrist was present in 
the local hospital, only monthly visits for prescription and referral purposes were 
available (Ganesan 2011:359). On a nationwide level, 10 out of 26 health districts had 
acute inpatient units in hospitals and only five medium-term rehabilitation centres were 
available prior to the tsunami, most of which had not refurbished their facilities from their 
days as ‘mental asylums' (WHO 2013:78). For a population of 20 million, in Sri Lanka 
there were 30 psychiatrists, 3 clinical psychologists and 10 psychiatric social workers in 
2001, most of whom were based in urban areas (Underhill 2002:88). Combined with the 
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seemingly paradoxical mixture of high mean life satisfaction rates, lack of mental health 
facilities and the then-ongoing ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka was ill equipped to face a 
nationwide level of mental distress (Budosan et al 2007). It was assumed that such issues 
were being resolved through social institutions such as religion and family, given the 
attitudes and values held by Sri Lankans across various regions.  
Therefore, perhaps it is not surprising that literature from certain areas in Sri 
Lanka suggests that the locals considered culturally ‘neutral’ mental health interventions 
as a strange exercise. Lawrence’s (2010) case study of Navalady, a fishing village in 
Batticaloa, illustrated how local Tamils utilized their sea goddesses not as mere idols of 
worship, but as fellow kin members in life who would protect them and offer advice 
whenever necessary. As a result, after the tsunami certain villagers who once had statues 
of certain sea goddesses in their houses decided not to replace them in their new homes 
and worship different deities instead, expressing their anger towards the damage caused 
by the tsunami and the sea goddess not being able to protect them (Lawrence 2010:97-
98). Mahesan Ganesan (2006:243, 2011), a Sri Lankan psychiatrist, observed that local 
villagers in his area of Batticaloa thought that the Western mental health professionals’ 
psychosocial projects ‘offered comic relief for the survivors even though it was probably 
not intended as such,’ whereas the mental health professionals adopted a solemn approach 
towards their initiatives. Culturally inappropriate interventions were not uncommon, to 
the extent where village leaders and religious authorities openly expressed displeasure 
towards mental health professionals (Wickramage 2006). Local villages have had their 
own mechanisms for resilience and internalising grief or pain through religious and social 
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institutions; if any external parties wanted to help, they should have considered what was 
already available. 
You Don’t Always Get Out What You Put In: The ‘Adhocracy’ of Relief Aid 
 In the wake of the tsunami, vast amounts of foreign aid arrived in the form of cash, 
humanitarian workers and material, medical and psychiatric assistance. Aid workers who 
were in the field focused initially on material assistance for tsunami survivors. In the 
coastal district of Batticaloa in Sri Lanka, the first humanitarian assistance groups who 
arrived primarily focused on distributing medical supplies, food and temporary housing 
(Galappatti 2005:65). Despite the chaos presented by the Buddhist poya day holidays, Sri 
Lankan civil society organisations were largely responsible for the initial round of relief 
schemes as people living in inland areas promptly arrived out to coastal areas and 
provided material assistance (Stirrat 2006:12). Due to annual flooding incidents and other 
natural disasters alongside decades of ethnic conflict, many local villages had self-
sufficient disaster management mechanisms that were tested and proven, attesting to Sri 
Lankans’ resilience and adaptability to natural disasters. Within minutes of the first wave 
striking the island, locals mobilised their bikes and automobiles to transport everyone at 
the beach near the Batticaloa lagoon to the hospital, which was the highest point in the 
local area (Gaasbeek 2010:125-126). Material assistance was initially an effective 
exercise of co-ordination by local communities; while not having experienced such a 
large-scale tsunami themselves, they had nonetheless endured multiple floods and other 
manmade conflicts to develop autonomous systems to protect people.  
 However, global attention on the tsunami, albeit with intentions on helping fellow 
humankind, caused problems for all parties involved in humanitarian assistance. The lack 
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of a national government presence to allocate and administer foreign assistance has been 
cited as a cause behind the disorganised aid responses, unlike Indonesia and India where 
the national governments had regulated what foreign agencies were able to bring (Stirrat 
2006:11). The lack of local NGOs available to collaborate with international 
organisations caused problems when attempting to assign geographic areas and fields of 
expertise for all the organisations, eventually resulting in the United Nations taking over 
existing operations (Gaasbeek 2010:130; Stirrat 2006:12-13). Despite the well-tuned, 
utilitarian veneer of relief aid presented through the media, relief schemes in fact reflected 
an ‘adhocracy,’ reliant on impromptu decisions. Stirrat’s (2006) account of humanitarian 
action in Sri Lanka was comparable to Dunn’s (2012) observations in Georgia during 
2008, especially when international NGOs had started to amass upon the island. 
Excessive donations and subsequent donors’ expectations of using the funds ‘effectively’ 
implied that most aid projects had to adhere to Western understandings of relief action, 
which implied policy uniformity and consequently a lack of cross-cultural flexibility 
(Dunn 2012; Gaasbeek 2010). Put succinctly, humanitarian sentiments became 
overbearing due to the excess amount of donations, a lack of local NGOs with whom 
relief package co-ordination could be organised and media pressure to utilise funds in a 
way deemed appropriate by the donors.  
 One example of the inefficient relief schemes is the Sri Lankan government’s 
housing re-establishment scheme. In response to the growing number of uninhabitable 
housing in the wake of the tsunami, the government introduced compensation funding of 
up to 250,000 Sri Lankan rupees (SL Rs.) for destroyed homes and SL Rs. 100,000 for 
damaged ones. However, the funding went to homeowners, not necessarily tenants, with 
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no compensation available for damaged goods inside the house. Furthermore, in the 
Balapitiya region, there were 713 fully damaged houses; given that the Housing Authority 
on average construct 100 to 200 houses annually, this posed logistical and manpower 
problems as the Authority was facing an unprecedented number of jobs to complete 
(Gamburd 2010:68-69). Ashok, a public servant interviewed by Gamburd (2010:69), had 
the following to say: 
I can’t like all of the way things were done… The government should have looked after the people 
whose houses were fully destroyed first. … They have helped the people whose houses were half 
damaged and they are now fully restored, while a lot of people who lost everything are still in 
plank houses. 
With little consideration to village or town-specific situations and resource – both human 
and inanimate – constraints, the recovery process slowed down to the extent where those 
who were guaranteed housing were still living in temporary shelters in mid-2005. Even 
with families whose houses were built, some were still living in shelters as their families 
were too large (Gamburd 2010:69-70).  Similar to the homogenous, saturated situation 
international actors had created in regards to humanitarian assistance, the Sri Lankan 
government’s housing scheme in the Balapitiya region showed that the one-size-fits-all 
approach was not working, and that a tailored, collaborative framework was needed.  
Post-Tsunami Mental Health Interventions: Drowning in Trauma? 
 In the wake of the tsunami, foreign psychiatrists and doctors had predicted that 
the Boxing Day tsunami would leave Sri Lanka with a prolonged state of trauma, with 
severe long-term effects. Given the lack of mental health facilities in Sri Lanka, Western 
psychiatrists and doctors expressed concern at the potential of chronic depression and 
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Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) affecting survivors’ mental states (Galappatti 
2005; Watters 2010:69). Unlike Fassin and Rechtman’s (2009:163-169) recollection of 
humanitarian psychiatry in Armenia after the 1988 earthquake, most requests for 
psychiatric relief aid in Sri Lanka came from foreigners. Notions of compassion towards 
fellow compatriots were deemed unnecessary, as the concept of ‘trauma’ became 
widespread and steadfastly quasi-universal through one of its subsets, PTSD (Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009; Young 1993). Unequipped and caught unaware of the tsunami, in the 
eyes of mental health professionals Sri Lanka was about to face a nation-wide level of 
trauma. According to Western mental health professionals, the spread of trauma – in 
particular PTSD – was deemed to be a near certainty in Sri Lanka and action would need 
to be taken immediately (Watters 2010:69-70). The near-consensus agreement from 
Western psychiatrists and doctors with no socio-cultural connections to Sri Lanka 
declaring a national endemic-esque prevalence of PTSD demonstrates how it has become 
widely accepted in mental health discourse. Even without taking cultural variation into 
account, implicit universalist assumptions made about the tsunami survivors as sufferers 
of PTSD suggests its cross-cultural validity is now taken for granted.  
 Therefore, perhaps it is not surprising that psychiatric interventions in Sri Lanka 
followed a similar vein to other forms of humanitarian intervention taking place. Debra 
Wentz, executive director of the New Jersey Association of Mental Health Agencies, was 
on holiday in Sri Lanka when the tsunami struck. Watters (2010:67-68) describes the 
course of action Wentz took after having witnessed the tsunami in its path of destruction: 
Initially she focused on alerting the drug companies she worked with to the medical needs of the 
population. She then turned her efforts to alerting the Sri Lankan population about the 
devastating psychological impact that would soon be felt. … In an interview that ran repeatedly 
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on Sri Lankan national television in the days and weeks after the tsunami, Wentz told the 
population of how the symptoms of PTSD cluster… she advised everyone to be on the lookout 
for this pathological behavio[u]r in both adults and children. 
However, psychiatric professionals at the University of Colombo (2005) had issued a 
statement regarding the forthcoming mental health interventions, which ended up being 
overlooked by many Western organisations. They reminded foreign mental health 
professionals that the survivors’ responses ‘are ordinary human reactions to a crisis’ and 
that they ought to ‘attend to what the affected people are signalling by this distress’ 
(University of Colombo Faculty 2005, emphasis kept). While Western assistance was 
appreciated and needed due to a lack of existing mental health facilities in Sri Lanka, their 
resources should be allocated carefully in a collaborative manner. Without having a sound 
appreciation of Sri Lankan cultural values, Wentz implicitly assumed that Sri Lankans 
were as equally susceptible to PTSD symptoms as Western countries, reflecting a widely-
espoused assumption held by many Western mental health practitioners and trauma 
specialists. Despite Wentz’s intentions towards minimizing trauma among local 
communities through prompt action, they took place under assumptions, not necessarily 
through empirical evidence.  
 Furthermore, the hyper-competitive nature exhibited by international NGOs also 
continued onto mental health interventions. A significant majority of psychosocial and 
psychiatric programmes targeted Sri Lankan children, due to their relative vulnerability 
to their surroundings compared to adults. However, Ganesan (2006:245) noticed a certain 
trend among the mental health professionals in their activities: 
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It was common for the [facilitators] to differentiate between ‘our’ children and ‘their’ children. At 
times children were asked not to play with children belonging to other groups. This often led to 
conflicts… and at times brought about animosity between the children themselves. 
The Othering of children by NGOs, even in natural disaster settings, suggests an explicit 
desire towards gaining recognition from their donors about undertaking substantial work. 
As Ganesan (2006) commented above, instead of providing allegedly ‘better’ treatment 
to children, the competitive nature of NGOs had created schisms between them, thus 
further deteriorating what were already fragile mental states from fractured family ties. 
Regardless of the final outcome, provided they could appease the Western public eye in 
their actions and maximise positive publicity, the NGOs competed with one another to 
‘heal’ as many children as possible. 
Conclusion 
 The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami had an immense impact on Sri Lankan society. 
Local communities demonstrated experience and resilience in their responses to the 
natural destruction left after the tsunami; the initial responses to the disaster were 
primarily led by them, with relatively little assistance provided by external organisations. 
However, once the deluge of international governmental and non-governmental actors 
arrived in Sri Lanka with an exorbitant sum of funds and resources at their disposal, 
humanitarian intentions transformed into a hyper-competitive environment based on 
building one’s reputation instead of livelihoods for tsunami survivors. It is not surprising 
that mental health interventions took a similar course to other strands of humanitarian 
action, considering the lack of consultation and an abundance of culturally insensitive 
mental health policies that took place. Similar to humanitarian actors’ sincere intentions 
being mistranslated in practice, the imposition of PTSD on the survivors led to more 
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confusion and misunderstandings surrounding mental health interventions. There are 
some analytical points to be considered from the erroneous practices adopted by mental 
health professionals; the first point, discussed in the next chapter, critiques how Western 
mental health professionals adopt a universalist understanding of human beings and how 
they experience mental distress through the Cartesian duality.  
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Chapter 2 – Blurring the Cartesian Duality: Embodying Anguish 
The Cartesian duality is where the human body is divided into two components: 
the mind and the body. In Western contexts, this duality was generally assumed to hold 
for everyone, although it has now been contested by many2; the mind and the body are 
not always considered as two distinct entities in one physical ‘being.’ In various socio-
cultural settings, the relationship between the mind and the body can take different 
courses. Mental distress cannot be solely attributed to chemical imbalances in the brain; 
the surrounding environment can play equally significant roles in creating and 
perpetuating anguish. This chapter explains how Sri Lankans interviewed by various 
mental health professionals and anthropologists processed ‘trauma’ after the 2004 Boxing 
Day tsunami, then demonstrate that the Cartesian duality is not as clear cut as many 
mental health professionals expected. Despite assumptions of quasi-universal 
traumatisation amongst the survivors, ethnographic evidence collected by anthropologists 
and various mental health professionals suggest otherwise. Furthermore, the impact of 
Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic conflict played a significant role in how survivors processed 
mental anguish, illustrating the importance of socio-political contexts. While the Western 
psychiatric lens is useful in finding correlations between abnormalities in bodily functions 
and social behaviour, it is not the only means to examine mental suffering. Through 
unpacking the links between the human body and how people experience and harness 
phenomena in everyday life, we come to understand the human being as an agential body 
                                                          
2 Similar to critiques of participatory development, the Cartesian duality has also been challenged by many. 
To name some references: Jackson (1994); Leder (1984, 1992); Lyon (1997); Scheper-Hughes and Lock 
(1987). 
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that influences and is influenced by various social and biological factors, instead of solely 
subscribing to biological determinism.  
The Mindful Body, the Embodied Mind and the Lived-Body: Rethinking Pain 
The Cartesian mind-body duality traces back its origins to an enquiry seeking to 
separate religion from science; in doing so it however created a set of power relations. 
René Descartes’ definitions of the corporeal and the incorporeal is such that the body – 
res extensa – was deemed to be devoid of intelligence and autonomy, because such tasks 
were assigned to the mind – res cogitans – which represented the ‘essence of self and the 
divine aspect of the human being’ (Leder 1984:29). The body was therefore akin to a 
machine or a mathematical equation that could be decomposed and ‘solved,’ opening up 
the possibility of compartmentalizing body parts and conducting positivist analyses that 
underpin the study of human anatomy (Leder 1984:30). It is through this Cartesian 
tradition that modern medicine and enquiries on the human mind began to develop. 
Foucault’s (1963, 1975) discussion of modern medicine’s origins stemmed from the 
French royalty’s need to monitor and eliminate those who prescribed false medicines, 
thus exploiting the ill. A centralized, unified body of knowledge to determine what is 
normal and what is pathological was therefore required to distinguish between ‘real’ and 
‘false’ medicine, thereby fostering a positivist understanding of the human anatomy 
through the ‘clinical gaze’ (Foucault 1963). As a result, knowledge started to play a role 
in power relations between those who create said knowledge and its ‘field’ and those who 
apply it; thus the power-knowledge relationship began to manifest itself (Foucault 1963; 
1975).  
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In response, Descartes’ rigid division between the mind and the body and their 
influences on human activity has been critiqued. There is more to human movement than 
determinism; the body is the first point of contact between the person and their physical 
surroundings. The concept of ‘experience’ starts from the physical body and its actions 
and sensations are then interpreted and analysed by the individual. Put succinctly, human 
experiences are defined using the ability of sensing and moving within one’s surroundings 
(Jackson 1998:18-19; Leder 1984:31-32). Scheper-Hughes and Lock’s (1987) discussion 
of a ‘mindful body’ challenged the Cartesian duality, by showing that the mind-body 
distinction is not as discrete as expected in non-Western cultural settings. There is more 
to the ‘body’ than its physical, tangible form: social bodies and the body politic also exist, 
where the individual influences and is influenced by their surroundings (Desjarlais and 
Throop 2011:89; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:8; Ten Have 1995). These ‘bodies’ then 
interact with one another to define the experience of human distress, with one application 
being the separation of diseases – a set of generalised statements – from illnesses – the 
personal features of human anguish. However, this process deemphasised the political 
and collective aspects of describing human illnesses and prioritised instead the 
individualised, biomedical lens (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:9-10). Therefore, the 
concept of human suffering needs to be reconfigured to encompass a more holistic 
understanding of how people’s senses, movements and thoughts affect and are affected 
by said suffering.  
The ‘lived-body’ and its avenues of expression – one example being emotions – 
is what scholars influenced by phenomenology propose as a different way to understand 
the human being and most importantly, their experiences. Understanding people as lived-
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bodies harnesses ‘the very [centre] of one’s experience, moods, expressions and projects,’ 
instead of treating them as deterministic physical entities, open to being controlled by 
one’s own mind or others’ (Leder 1984:36). Instead of focusing exclusively on the rigid 
boundaries between bodily and cognitive functions, an approach discussing emotions and 
how they are formed can show the human body as a ‘whole,’ interacting with its 
surroundings (Lyon 1997; Lyon and Barbalet 1994). This is because emotions operate ‘in 
social processes as the basis of agency’; its role is to facilitate and underpin decision-
making processes and subsequent actions (Lyon and Barbalet 1994:50). Aho’s (2008:244) 
application of phenomenology in psychiatry aims to expand the definitions of the Self as 
an exclusively biological entity and recognise how ‘our experience of things… is shaped 
by the sociohistorical situation into which we grow.’ An example of such an analysis is 
Corin’s (2007) discussion of psychosis and schizophrenia in Montreal that focused on 
treating symptoms as phenomena, representative of how people experience distress. 
Given how mental distress can be communicated through not just language but also 
emotions and other bodily functions, focusing on their role in mental health as a separate 
entity from biological or socio-cultural determinants provides greater depth towards 
understanding how mental distress is processed and experienced by people. 
As a result, the notion of ‘pain’ becomes broadened. Sufferers can make 
distinctions between mental and physical pain, adhering to the Cartesian duality. 
However, when the source of the pain remains ambiguous or multiple sources have been 
identified, then the Cartesian duality becomes blurred and one ends up with the 
‘experience’ of pain and suffering (Jackson 1994:210). Secondly, pain cannot be 
measured using an objective scale; it is up to the sufferer to confirm whether they are 
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experiencing it and occasionally identify its origins, but they are unable to determine 
whether their suffering is greater than someone else’s (Jackson 1994:213). Furthermore, 
pain cannot always be communicated in a way that all parties involved will comprehend 
as certain aspects may not be able to be described accurately using the body (Scarry 
1985:4). Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ (1992) account of infant mortality, maternal health and 
violence in Brazil sheds light on the complexity of the mind-body relationship on illnesses. 
Despite numerous visits, one of Scheper-Hughes’ (1992:181) interviewees said that the 
doctors ‘never told me what was wrong… They just kept sending me home with 
[remedies] for my heart.’ Given the materialist focus of biomedicine and biology and its 
subsequent division of the mind and the body as two separate entities, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the doctors of Alto do Cruzeiro were unable to differentiate between 
nervos (pain from the head due to chronic hunger) and fome (pain from hunger itself in 
the stomach) (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987; Scheper-Hughes 1992). ‘Pain’ then 
becomes more ambiguous and not necessarily restricted uniquely to the mind or the body, 
but revolves around the sufferer’s existence. Combined with temporal dimensions, pain 
becomes harder to trace and is felt ‘everywhere’ by the sufferer.  
 The concept of ‘social’ illness should then be considered by medical and 
development practitioners in order to understand local understandings towards a certain 
phenomenon – in this instance, mental anguish. Scheper-Hughes (1992:195) describes 
social illness in her observations as something ‘that has gathered around the primary 
experience of chronic hunger,’ which spreads from the stomach to various parts of the 
human body, eventually leading to migraines and a sensation of weak legs – this belief 
stems from the residents’ understanding that all the veins in the body are connected to 
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one another and are identical, regardless of their location. The chronic nature of poverty 
has brought about hunger and its lasting consequences are expressed through headaches, 
catatonic behaviour and a sense of weakness enveloping the body. The role of social 
capital as a positive determinant of improved mental health (Harpham et al 2004) could 
be questioned as the residents interacted with one another on a frequent basis, discussing 
the sources of their pain and their durations (Scheper-Hughes 1992). Since poverty in the 
‘Alto’ is widespread, these symptoms of nervos became endemic among the residents, 
thereby making it a ‘social’ illness. Approaching diseases in this manner integrates local 
perceptions regarding illness and its effects on society and vice versa, providing a 
different viewpoint to that of medical staff.  
Why Biomedicine? Why Materialism? The Ivory Tower of Mental Health 
Psychiatry’s consistency and accuracy in treating those suffering from mental 
distress remains contested. Rosenhan’s (1973) experiment on pseudopatients – that is, 
people who pretended to be  mentally ill – served as one example of psychiatry’s 
“dogmatic” nature, as the participants had to exhibit certain demeanours in order to be 
declared ‘clinically sane’ and therefore discharged from institutions. Henrich, Heine and 
Norenzayan (2010) argue that psychological research overly fixates on results from 
“WEIRD” (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) countries and 
assumes that the rest of the world behaves in a similar fashion. They examined various 
cognitive functions such as spatial analysis and IQ heritability, concluding that persons 
from WEIRD countries were the least representative ones for the global sample. The 
division of ‘neurosis’ as a nosological category into two axes in the fourth edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) – Axis I represented 
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quantifiable, ‘real’ illnesses that could be addressed promptly using pharmaceuticals, 
while Axis II was defined as illnesses that were best resolved through religious or 
philosophical activities – illustrated gaps in psychiatric literature that could not be 
explained through the biomedical lens (Aho 2008:245). Western psychiatry, like all other 
branches of knowledge, is a constantly evolving and changing one. However, its adamant 
stance on the cross-cultural validity of its nosology seems unchanged. 
The origins of psychiatry’s universalist stance can be found from the discipline’s 
focus on biological functions, as they could be empirically verified across many people. 
Descartes’ intentions to define the body as a subject of enquiry and the mind as something 
that God bestows upon people defined modern science, as it became increasingly fixated 
on materialist understandings of the human body (Leder 1984; Ten Have 1995). 
Consequently, increasing neuroscience funding and continuous examinations of the 
human anatomy provided the biological foundations for psychiatric research: the human 
brain. This is because its fundamental features largely remain the same across various 
ethnicities, genders and different cultural settings (Horwitz 2002:136). Combined with 
the emergence of genetics as a growing area of enquiry in biology, evolutionary 
psychology received greater attention as psychiatrists aimed towards establishing 
empirical, scientific credibility in their discipline by using materialist analyses of human 
behaviour (Horwitz 2002:132-133). Using this discipline’s line of argumentation, mental 
distress is understood as an ‘illness,’ attributed to chemical imbalances in the brain. Given 
the quasi-identical nature of this organ, mental illnesses occur to anyone, anywhere and 
can be understood in a single, identical manner, resembling the ‘partial analysis’ method 
used for somatic illnesses (Foucault 1963; Mills 2013:5). By defining the human brain as 
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the foundation from which all mental distress stems, Western psychiatry resembles its 
medical counterparts by mimicking their grounds of legitimacy and applying them to 
mental discomfort. 
However, the pathologization of mental distress – defining mental distress to be 
an ‘illness’ – creates stigma not only for the distressed, but also among development 
practitioners. The World Health Organization (2010) states stigma towards the mentally 
ill as one of the main hindrances toward improving mental health. However, social 
prejudice starts by problematizing mental distress as a ‘disease’ instead of another term 
such as a ‘challenge,’ as such labels increase the social burden of mental distress on 
sufferers and their families (Lachal 2003:5). The pathological and nosological expansions 
of mental illness has created issues such as misdiagnoses, where non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have made guidelines on how to spot the mentally ‘ill’ or ‘insane’ 
(Mills 2014:61-64). This is a ‘double-edged sword’ outcome: on one hand people could 
assist those in need by identifying their symptoms, but it could also be used to legitimise 
societal exclusion by creating unequal power relations against minority groups in society, 
while boosting profits of the pharmaceutical industry (Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Mills 
2014; Smith 2002). Combined with the aforementioned problems of technical assistance 
and the problematisation of mental distress as an illness, the domination of Western-
influenced universalist discourses in psychiatry has caused issues of cultural insensitivity 
and treatment inefficacies in developing countries. Despite contestations against the 
Cartesian duality by anthropologists, psychiatrists and other mental health personnel 
maintain their materialist, biomedicine-centric ways due to the casual relationship 
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between abnormal trends from the brain and human behaviour being proposed by Western 
psychiatric research. 
One possible reason for psychiatry’s materialist-centric stance stems from the 
political economy of pharmaceuticals 3  – put succinctly, the profitability of 
pharmaceutical market expansion into developing countries. Mills (2013, 2014) likens 
the MGMH’s proposal to ‘scale-up’ mental health facilities and medications to 
colonisation of the global South, as developing countries have no means to express their 
opinions. Given the contested nature of psychiatry and the validity of its treatment 
methods entailing alterations of brain chemicals by drug intoxication – in other words, 
consuming psychotropic substances – it is bizarre that the methods being criticised in the 
global North are being unquestioned in its applications in the global South via MGMH 
initiatives (Bemme and D’Souza 2012; Moncrieff 2009; Summerfield 2012). Instead of 
defining their projects as ‘interventions,’ MGMH proponents perceive their work as 
‘treatment,’ formulating their criteria of normal and abnormal behaviour on Western 
psychiatry and eliminating any means of cooperation or even cross-cultural 
communication (Mills 2013:8). Despite what GMH advocates have stated regarding their 
openness towards cooperating with the global South (Bemme and D’Souza 2012; Lancet 
Global Mental Health Group 2007), their projects and rhetoric thus far indicate otherwise. 
Until Western psychiatrists acknowledge the plural nature of understanding the human 
experience beyond their materialist-centric norms, such rifts will remain.  
                                                          
3 I intend to discuss this topic briefly for the purpose of completeness; the focal points of this thesis lie 
elsewhere.  
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Pharmaceutical companies are aware of the potential profitability of biomedicine 
in developing countries. For example, profits for certain products greatly outweigh fines 
from companies’ illegal activities: Wilson (2010; cited in Mills 2014:43) reported that 
AstraZeneca received $21.6 billion in revenue from Seroquel, an anti-psychotic; in 
contrast, the company was fined $520 million for false advertising. As pharmaceutical 
firms argue for their products as solutions for societal problems, more people increasingly 
take psychotropic medications (Jenkins 2011; Lakoff 2005), a phenomenon mirrored in 
Mills’ (2014) study of mental health policy in India. The inability to affect world crop 
prices is cited as one of the primary determinants of suicide among Indian farmers, as 
they are subject to price fluctuations that affect their revenue. However, local NGOs and 
government health officials have attributed the suicides to individual issues such as 
chemical imbalances in the brain, without considering the macro-level situation in which 
the farmers find themselves: varying crop prices, indebtedness and no government 
support (Ecks and Basu 2009; Mills 2014:36-41). Coincidentally or perhaps 
unsurprisingly, antidepressants are a viable source of revenue for pharmaceutical 
companies in India: a study in 2005 revealed that 77% of surveyed Indian pharmacies 
stocked Prozac, a higher rate than Ibuprofen, household painkiller (Mills 2014; Tsao 
2009:2). Having witnessed increasing revenue in the developed world, pharmaceutical 
companies have started to expand their operations into countries hitherto left unexposed 
to Western psychiatric methods such as psychotropic medicine. They have already started 
to amass significant revenue and profit from their pharmaceutical products and continue 
to do so. 
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As a result, grounding one’s analysis solely on biomedicine or psychosocial 
perspectives should be avoided to prioritise patients’ experiences of mental anguish. 
Instead of relying on the DSM – whose definition of mental illness primarily focuses on 
biological and Western socio-cultural aspects that are resolved through biomedicine – as 
the absolute authority on mental distress, by encouraging patients to describe their own 
experiences and perspectives regarding the suffering they have endured, they are treated 
as a complex entity influenced not only by biological factors, but also the world in which 
they live (Aho 2008:245). If doctors were to omit the patient’s ‘being-in-the-world’ – this 
could be their personal history, lifestyle, general behaviour and interpersonal 
relationships – when examining them, it is possible that they will overlook socio-cultural 
variables that affect their patient (Leder 1984:37). As Davis (2000: cited in Das and Das 
2007:69) summarises, evaluations of medical systems should not only consider the 
effectiveness of medical interventions, but also ‘what they allow people to say,’ thus 
focusing on a collaborative doctor-patient relationship grounded in the patient’s 
recollections of their experiences.  Attempts at treating mental anguish should first focus 
on the patient’s understanding of pain; relabelling one notion of mental illness as another 
does not shed light, but instead repackages an unanswered question.  
However, the disparities between multiple approaches towards mental distress – 
in particular those between local communities and external development agencies – poses 
problems on which perspective is more ‘accurate’ in assessing the needs of people. 
Although attempts at ‘transcultural psychiatry’ have taken place and demonstrated the 
importance of taking cultural variation into account (Bhui 2011; Kiev 1972; Kleinman 
1988), such sentiments do not seem to have been ingrained or shared by all development 
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practitioners working in mental health. Through perceiving developing countries as 
‘somehow categorically and intrinsically different from [developed countries],’ a 
dichotomy of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ is created. Consequently, ‘we’ believe that ‘they’ 
are different, even before getting to know ‘their’ socio-cultural values (Richter 2004: 446). 
This is mostly due to the differences between how psychiatrists, psychologists and 
development practitioners perceive mental health in a development context, which further 
disrupts reconciliation between and within theory and practice (Desjarlais et al 1995; 
Sugar, Kleinman and Heggenhougen 1994). There are disputes between psychiatrists and 
psychologists who maintain a culture and context-specific approach towards treating 
mental illnesses – thus suggesting heterogeneity in psychiatric treatment (Bracken, Giller 
and Summerfield 1995; Miller 1999; Young 1993) – and those who adopt a universalist 
stance, where everyone reacts to a given phenomenon in the same manner (Horwitz 2002; 
Kiev 1972). The contested nature of understanding the human mind has subsequently 
resulted in policymaking marred by ambiguity, failing to achieve self-defined objectives. 
Applications in Wake of the Boxing Day Tsunami 
 In Chapter 1 I argued that many mental health interventions formulated by 
psychiatrists failed to achieve their goals, but they nonetheless persisted. This is because 
psychiatrists, not psychologists, were initially preferred in humanitarian settings due to 
their training in medicine; such preferences have remained over time. Doctors and 
psychiatrists shared the common language of a materialist, biomedicine-centric 
understanding of the human body, reducing the possibility of misunderstandings. 
Consequently, a psychiatrist interviewed by Fassin and Rechtman (2009:167) who 
participated in humanitarian relief work in Armenia during 1988 was suggested to join 
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her colleagues while at Médecins sans frontières (MSF), as psychiatrists were qualified 
doctors and able to prescribe pharmaceuticals. Since humanitarian interventions had 
hitherto primarily focused on material assistance and resolving physical maladies, 
medical staff requested personnel who were capable of understanding Western medical 
language when the suggestion of mental health interventions arose in MSF discussions. 
Furthermore, time constraints posed in humanitarian contexts often leave little time 
available for on-site discussions, with organisations focusing more time on efficient ways 
to mobilise resources and personnel (Fassin and Rechtman 2009:167-168). Therefore, 
what had initially become a decision based on time constraints and ‘convenience’ became 
gradually taken for granted in future humanitarian projects, as observed by Pupavac (2002) 
in her case study of psychosocial intervention in Kosovo and other cases of humanitarian 
psychiatry in Palestine as documented by Fassin and Rechtman (2009) and Sri Lanka, as 
shown in the previous chapter. 
Mental health concepts grounded in Western psychiatry are also preferred by 
development practitioners, as they could explain mental anguish through materialist 
reasoning that could be solved through technical assistance, such as providing 
psychotropic pills. Mental distress poses difficulties when attempting to provide 
qualitative variables to define the concept. For instance, the DSM has been accused of 
forcing normalisation onto heterogeneous issues such as trauma through the term PTSD 
(Summerfield 1999). Young (1993) and Summerfield (1999, 2001) argue that PTSD is a 
social construct by demonstrating how Americentric DSM definitions of the disease fail 
to correctly diagnose certain non-American patients, citing arbitrary criteria for symptom 
durations and the conflation of hardship with mental illness. Given the label’s origin as a 
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means to categorise American veterans from the Vietnam War, the validity of PTSD as a 
diagnostic tool is primarily confined to patients from a European or European-American 
cultural background (Young 1993). Therefore, its universal usage to designate any patient 
with trauma-associated symptoms may pose problems in other cultural contexts (Hinton 
and Lewis-Fernandez 2010). However, narrow, specific definitions such as PTSD make 
development practitioners’ oft-preferred means of intervention – technical assistance – 
easier to justify, as they could cite Western psychiatric research as evidence (Li 2007). 
Ultimately, contestations over definitions of mental health make it a difficult concept to 
define, unless one utilises psychiatric research that attributes abnormal human behaviour 
to chemical imbalances in the brain. This suggests one possible reason why psychiatry’s 
materialist foundations were looked upon favourably, as casual relations could be 
suggested.  
However, the usage of PTSD for all trauma-related mental health issues in 
developing countries is a problematic initiative. It was estimated that 14% to 39% of Sri 
Lankan children examined were suffering from PTSD four to five weeks after the tsunami, 
based on criteria developed in North America (Neuner et al 2006). However, PTSD 
literature often states that symptoms are likely to appear in the first three to six months 
after traumatic incidents, thus questioning the validity of Neuner et al’s (2006) results; 
the pathologisation of people’s reactions to tragic incidents can lead to hasty conclusions 
such as this one (University of Colombo Faculty 2005; Watters 2010:70-71). Furthermore, 
trauma in a Sri Lankan context is not always solely felt from a personal level; given the 
interconnectedness of family members and within the local community, the coexistence 
of community-wide, district-wide and even region-wide trauma alongside personal grief 
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are plausible scenarios, akin to how Cambodia has been labelled a nation of trauma from 
its Khmer Rouge period (Boulet 2009; Fernando 2009; Somasundaram 2010). Therefore, 
how Sri Lankans respond to trauma could be different to the patterns observed from 
Westerners; treating the former group using standard PTSD criteria influenced by the 
Cartesian duality may lead to unintended consequences that further disrupt their mental 
wellbeing.   
On the other hand, mental health interventions led by expatriate psychiatrists 
focusing on guiding tsunami survivors to express their experiences in culturally 
appropriate settings showed greater potential than culturally ‘neutral’ interventions. 
Ganesan (2006, 2011) and Fernando (2008, 2009) explain their position as cross-cultural 
and linguistic interpreters: their fluency in Sinhalese, most commonly spoken language 
in Sri Lanka, and sound understanding of Sri Lankan socio-cultural values helped their 
initiatives towards re-establishing effective mental health facilities. While telling one’s 
trauma accounts to an impartial therapist with no common cultural ties may seem 
intimidating, sharing one’s experiences – instead of merely reciting ‘signs’ of mental 
illness – with fellow survivors fostered a sense of togetherness that many survivors had 
sought after losing family members from ethnic conflicts or the tsunami (Fernando 2009). 
By encouraging mental health professionals with local ties to come back, as seen by the 
first documented account of humanitarian psychiatry during the Armenian earthquake in 
1988, they were able to relate to the survivors’ needs and able to understand their 
recollections and embodiments of the tsunami in a culturally appropriate manner (Fassin 
and Rechtman 2009:167-170; Ganesan 2011). By evoking the personal connection one 
has with their motherland and home culture, mental health personnel were able to provide 
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culturally informed interventions that helped those in need, instead of primarily relying 
on biomedical interventions influenced from the Cartesian binary.  
In fact, it is through such mental health professionals through whom the tsunami 
survivors were able to communicate with ease compared to Western mental health 
personnel. Spivak’s concept of the ‘native informant’ can be extrapolated into this context 
(Kapoor 2004), where people from the same ‘imagined community,’ à la Anderson (1991), 
can empathize with one another without necessarily having to verbally express their 
sentiments. It is through their common socio-cultural background that expressions of 
mental trauma can be reinterpreted as experiences endured by beings-in-the-world. In 
Batticaloa, Ganesan (2011) encouraged the tsunami survivors to consult local Ayurvedic 
healers as well as his psychiatric profession, having been aware of the medical pluralism 
described by Tribe (2007); word had eventually spread over to the healers themselves 
about this proposal and the healers themselves also referred their clients to seek 
psychiatric assistance when they deemed problems to be mentally related, instead of being 
linked with deities. Fernando (2009) on the other hand consulted a parish priest, who 
helped find group therapy participants; having intimate knowledge of the prospective 
participants’ experiences and personalities helped create ideal social dynamics. Both 
Ganesan and Fernando were aware of the role of religion and local healers in Sri Lankan 
society and integrated emic views towards religion and medical pluralism with the etic – 
Western psychiatric treatments. Through treating the survivors’ recollections and 
symptoms of trauma as experiences understood under ‘familiar’ local socio-cultural 
settings, mental distress is not being pathologised under Western psychiatry. Instead, they 
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are considered as phenomena that are being resolved under local terms through a 
deliberative, inclusive process.  
However, finding expatriate psychologists and psychiatrists and assuming that 
they will always carry out culturally sensitive treatment plans is an ill-advised assumption. 
Put succinctly, native informants are not a panacea for mental health policies in 
developing countries. Spivak cautions overreliance on native informants, as they are no 
less susceptible to external interests than the Other examining a local community (Kapoor 
2004). It is not uncommon for pharmaceutical firms to sponsor psychiatric and 
psychosocial conferences; Pfizer sponsored one about the Sri Lankan tsunami, titled 
‘After the Tsunami: Mental Health Challenges to the Community for Today and 
Tomorrow’ (Watters 2010:80). One of the papers presented at the conference was by 
Davidson (2006), who reported that after four weeks of consuming Zoloft, a Pfizer-
produced antidepressant, his test participants’ trauma recurrence levels started to decrease. 
However, in the article he states that Zoloft had not been certified by the Food and Drug 
Administration for PTSD treatment. While no Sri Lankan psychiatrists were reported to 
have participated in the conference, Kapoor’s (2004) application of Spivak’s ideas serves 
a cautionary tale in conflicts of interest for mental health professionals, as they need to 
be capable of examining and critiquing their actions. Finding someone who knows the 
local socio-cultural values and languages – to ensure that mistranslations are minimised 
– and adapts their psychiatric toolkit accordingly is what is needed.  
 In any case, being aware of how past practices have affected mental health and 
knowing which new technologies to use is an important aspect of improving global mental 
health. Patel and Kleinman (2003) argue that the most effective mental health treatment 
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projects in developing countries were created by practitioners who not only adapted their 
knowledge with socio-cultural values espoused by their patients, but also continually 
worked on doctor-client relations. Essentially, those who conduct multiple, frequent self-
evaluations and adapt accordingly, on average, were able to meet the needs of their 
patients more effectively than those who did not adopt such practises. Similarly, Bhui 
(2011:91) discusses how psychiatrists ‘often talk about patients’ cultures but rarely about 
those of the professionals; yet professionals’ awareness of their own cultural histories and 
influences is at the heart of understanding the cultural interplay in therapeutic encounters.’ 
While the majority of attention towards mental health in developing countries is allocated 
towards the patients’ needs and cultural backgrounds, the aforementioned excerpts 
suggest that a greater focus ought to be made towards how mental health professionals 
evaluate their own practices. 
Conclusion 
As shown by the ethnographic recollections of mental health professionals during 
the Boxing Day tsunami recovery projects, mental health interventions following the 
tradition of a Cartesian duality were not always compatible with how the survivors 
themselves have processed the tsunami. In contrast, embodiment’s focus on the 
individual’s experience – how they come to analyse and process a given incident – helped 
psychiatric interventions become more holistic in its efforts to identify and alleviate 
mental distress. By supporting and encouraging survivors to share their experiences while 
finding trained personnel who are capable of understanding mental pain in cross-cultural 
contexts, the ways in which people experience and understand phenomena are taken into 
account, instead of imposing solely biomedical or psychosocial perspectives onto their 
45 
 
accounts. The next chapter will examine how certain survivors were excluded and 
marginalised in the humanitarian interventions they encountered during the tsunami 
recovery process, and what participatory development schemes can do to remedy the 
status quo. Since significant personal and social elements coexist in fields such as mental 
wellbeing and distress, incorporating local understandings of abnormal behaviour and 
mental anguish is necessary. However, given participatory development’s reputation as a 
tyrannical process, is there still some use of the concept? How can we transform the 
notion of participation from such perceptions towards something that genuinely supports 
inclusion? Through rethinking what it means to participate from a socio-political 
perspective, people’s experiences are taken into account in places where they matter: 
policymaking and governance. 
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Chapter 3 – Rethinking ‘Participation’ in Development 
The first two chapters discussed how certain mental health interventions in Sri 
Lanka following the 2004 tsunami failed to achieve their objectives. In response, this 
chapter will propose one possible method towards overcoming similar future 
predicaments. I will first examine one of the main polemics presented in development 
studies – the self-help paradox – which will then expand onto an attempt at answering 
this conundrum using participatory development. Its definitions and applications in 
development projects will be discussed, alongside its criticisms which have already been 
well documented4. I will then argue that by re-considering what it means to participate 
and to ‘include’ people by grounding participatory development in political engagement 
and raising awareness of collaborative mental health policymaking as a citizenship right, 
participatory development can move beyond the ‘tyranny’ as argued by Kothari (2001) 
and into something more ‘inclusive’ as suggested by Cornwall (2004). Using Hickey and 
Mohan’s (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) vision towards ‘relocating participation,’ attempts at 
improving mental health facilities need to be promoted by local communities through 
increasing their political involvement. Put succinctly, any NGO or additional government 
interventions must be in line with and expand the Sri Lankan Ministry of Health’s 2005-
2015 Plan on Mental Health, focusing on presenting deliberative processes of creating 
mental health policies as a right based on citizenship. How can development agencies 
help the developing world improve its livelihoods? Perhaps by understanding first how 
these people come to understand their surroundings and individual agencies, the 
                                                          
4 Please refer to the first footnote about critics of participatory development. 
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importance of political engagement and the various ways in which power manifests itself, 
participatory development becomes a catalyst of change. 
Helping Others Help Themselves: Paternalism or Altruism? 
One of the challenges in development policy is the ‘self-help paradox’ (Ellerman 
2001): how can international NGOs, outsiders to local communities, assist them in their 
endeavours towards self-determination without undermining their agency? In response, 
participatory development has been suggested as a means of overcoming paternalism in 
development projects. Starting with Chambers’ (1981) identification of biases that have 
been left ignored by field workers, he proposes various methods such as rapid rural 
appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural appraisal (PRA). These techniques feature a wide 
range of activities designed to encourage participants to express their opinions and create 
guides on their everyday lives through methods such as roleplays, interviews, games, 
maps, matrices and calendars. Various communication techniques are often used because 
literacy levels vary greatly between different villages and families (Chambers 1981, 1994; 
IDS 1996). Given the role of development workers as facilitators whose aim is to evoke 
and ‘tease out’ the answers from local communities themselves, they are in theory 
supposed to prioritise local agency and values over their personal convictions (Mosse 
2011:17). In other words, fieldworkers are ‘brokers’ between their employers – 
multilateral or national institutions and non-state actors – and the local community 
(Olivier de Sardan 2005:167-168). Participatory development’s origins stem from an 
increasing recognition towards the importance of inclusion and knowledge integration. 
By incorporating a ‘local’ voice into schemes, practitioners hoped that projects would 
better reflect the areas in which their policies were implemented. 
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However, participatory development has had its share of critics, who deride the 
initiative as a farce. In spite of its well-founded intentions, ‘participation’ has become an 
‘empty signifier’ simultaneously full and devoid of meaning, whose assumptions on 
developing countries entail naive portrayals of local communities (McKinnon 2007; 
Mohan and Stokke 2000). Participatory development projects have faced criticism due to 
a lack of stable theoretical grounding that guides how participation takes place (Hickey 
and Mohan 2004b). Given the lack of such foundations, participatory development 
became overly malleable to the extent of becoming the antithesis of its initial objectives, 
an example being the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative. 
Despite its rhetoric about local participation, PRSP schemes became ‘top-down’ due to 
their centralised and culturally ‘neutral’ nature that ended up controlling, rather than 
supporting, local communities’ autonomies (Hickey and Mohan 2004c). Power relations 
are created in spaces of participation, where local knowledge can be moulded accordingly 
to suit the needs of the development professional or village elites (Cornwall 2004:80-81; 
Mosse 1994, 2001). Furthermore, exclusion can also take place within cultures with little 
intervention by development agencies. Gender discrimination is one example, where the 
male chieftains in their respective communities have the utmost authority over issues 
related to every villager. This places women at a disadvantage when expressing their 
opinions (Blanchet 2001:640). Participation does take place, but its desired outcomes 
remain elusive due to failing to incorporate various structural factors or by treating them 
as static concepts. 
Therefore, if development practitioners were to seek local perspectives and 
knowledge on a given topic, getting to know how people experience and process said 
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topic is important. For a domain such as mental distress that has a significant personal 
component associated to it, ‘local’ and ‘personal’ perspectives play an important role in 
outsiders determining their course of action (Campbell and Burgess 2012; Miller 1999). 
Kleinman (1988) pointed out the non-responsiveness of psychiatrists in regards to 
symptoms of clinical depression expressed by patients in developing countries; Richter 
(2004:446) takes a more self-critical stance by arguing that development practitioners 
have hitherto avoided targeting and treating mental anguish over problems that she 
defines to be ‘easier,’ such as supplying lodging, garments and foodstuff. Mills (2014) 
has critiqued the work of BasicNeeds, a South Asia-based NGO; one of their initiatives 
at raising awareness of mental health in India involved distributing pictures of people 
with potential ‘symptoms’ of mental anguish. However, the images were not formulated 
in consultation with local communities, resulting in BasicNeeds deciding what is ‘normal’ 
and ‘abnormal’ on their own, while they considered their work as that of ‘civilising’ 
Indian society (Mills 2014:63, 65-68). Consequently, such practices have reproduced the 
‘double-edged sword’ outcome from unilaterally pathologizing mental anguish that was 
discussed in Chapter 2. While creating initiatives to incorporate communities’ viewpoints 
is important, it is equally essential to be aware of the power relations between not only 
the development practitioners and the communities, but also within the community as 
well. 
Does A Pill A Day Keep the Madness Away? Mental Health in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lankans are open to using both traditional and Western healing methods, often 
with specific guidelines on when to consult a certain branch of medicine. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, certain Tamil Sri Lankans opted to consult multiple goddesses and deities, 
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particularly in the wake of the tsunami as they were expressing anger towards their Tamil 
goddesses for not having protected their families and homes (Lawrence 2000, 2010). 
Similarly, health pluralism usually occurs in communities where people prefer its focus 
on incorporating multiple treatment methods to establish ‘completeness’ in examining the 
body, alternating between Western treatments and locally cultivated solutions as seen fit 
(Tribe 2007). For instance, many rural Sri Lankans consult Ayurvedic medicine and 
religion in regards to physical and mental distress respectively, mixing the two under 
certain instances (Lawrence 2010; Tribe 2007). Ayurvedic medicine is similar to other 
examples of ‘holistic medicine’ that consider the body as a sum of its organs, minds, 
environments and systems – in other words, the body as a whole (National Institutes of 
Health 2013; Weston 1992:75-76). Its approach focuses on maintaining equilibrium 
between the body, mind and spirit through herbal solutions designed to improve people’s 
vitality and provide pain relief (National Institutes of Health 2013). This is in contrast to 
the materialist, biomedicine-centric approach of Western medicine cultivated by the 
‘clinical gaze’ that separates the disease and its signs from the sufferer (Aho 2008; 
Foucault 1963; Leder 1992). Health pluralism is an ongoing practice in Sri Lanka with 
which its practitioners are satisfied; Western medicine’s ‘absolute’ values are likely to be 
questioned by those who consult multiple sources of medical advice.  
 After the tsunami, many international NGOs arrived with preconceived notions 
on Sri Lankan perspectives on mental health, as illustrated in Chapter 1. An American 
therapist who spent time in Sri Lanka stated that a lack of proficiency in Sinhala and 
Tamil or knowledge of Sri Lankan cultural attitudes served as an advantage: ‘One of the 
requirements of disaster trauma counsel[l]ing is to be non-political and non-
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denominational. We must not be influenced by religion, ethnicity or political affiliation 
(Watters 2010:75).’ Given that Western mental health professionals assumed they were 
dispatched to conduct the psychological equivalent of ‘applying a compress to someone’s 
injured head,’ many dismissed the importance of socio-cultural factors and focused on 
facilitating rapid mental health interventions (Watters 2010:75). This is because Western 
mental health professionals are, generally speaking, taught to remain impartial, apolitical 
and adopt a culturally ‘neutral’ stance. One of the most frequently utilised therapy 
techniques by Western psychiatrists and psychologists is titled ‘critical incident 
debriefing,’ which entails a verbal, immediate recollection of the traumatic incident by 
the survivor (Mitchell n.d.). As the mind is a distinct entity from the body according to 
the Cartesian duality, many Western mental health professionals thought focusing solely 
on psychosomatic or psychological symptoms was sufficient to relieve people of their 
mental ‘illnesses’ (Leder 1984; Watters 2010). Furthermore, a simplified but 
parsimonious message was more likely to gain donor support (Campbell and Burgess 
2012:381). Therefore, aid agencies assumed that other non-Western cultures would 
behave in a similar manner to Western societies, further reinforcing the universalist 
assumptions in Western psychiatry and development practitioners’ confidence in its 
techniques. 
However, ethnographic evidence gathered by mental health professionals from a 
Sri Lankan cultural background suggested otherwise. The one-sided, homogenous and 
non-cultural approach adopted by mental health professionals exacerbated what was 
already a rushed humanitarian intervention scheme full of miscommunications and 
lacking in co-operation (Stirrat 2006). As cautioned by Bruner (1986) when discussing 
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the complications surrounding the anthropology of experience, the tsunami survivors’ 
verbal expressions were assumed to completely represent their experiences. However, 
certain tsunami survivors did not express grief openly, preferring instead to first internally 
process the source of their grief, seek guidance from deities and then grieve in public 
(Fernando 2005, Lawrence 2010). Consequently, pathologising distress as an ‘illness’ 
that could be cured using universalist assumptions founded from Western psychiatry 
resulted in relief programmes that did not consider the survivors’ socio-cultural 
backgrounds, two of which were described by Wickramage (2006:168): 
In Kalmuani in the Eastern province, a foreign group offered sessions that integrated drama and 
music therapy as a means of ‘psychosocial release’. This psychosocial drama ‘troupe’, 
conducted a once-only psychosocial workshop with the children and young people of the 
affected communities (predominantly Muslim), involving expressive Western dance and song, in 
an area near a mosque. The vehement response by some community leaders and Imams of the 
local area to government authorities came swiftly. 
(…) 
A headline in one island newspaper many months after the Tsunami read; ‘17 Japanese experts 
arrive to undertake psychosocial activities for Tsunami victims’, and written somewhere near the 
end of the article the comment ‘bi-lingual interpreters needed urgently’. 
The hastiness shown by these humanitarian and development organisations led to 
ineffective policies in Sri Lankan communities, due to the short-term nature of their 
interventions that also happened to disrespect their audiences’ values. If they had taken 
some time to negotiate with local and international NGOs to understand existing socio-
cultural attitudes instead of hastily pursuing interventions, perhaps more thoughtful, 
effective and well-executed mental health plans would have been implemented.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, this is where incorporating socio-cultural aspects into 
examining the mentally anguished can contribute positively, one example being emic-etic 
mental health frameworks. For example, the Armenian earthquake of 1988 was the first 
time humanitarian psychiatry took place, according to Fassin and Rechtman (2009). The 
motivations behind humanitarian psychiatry were mostly based on Armenian 
psychiatrists’ longing to return to their homeland to assist their distressed compatriots; 
thus their actions were justified by ‘humanitarian reason’ (Fassin and Rechtman 
2009:166-167). Having mental health professionals who understand the local socio-
cultural setting can help overcome the expression-experience impasse, as demonstrated 
by the Armenian psychiatrists who returned to their home country in their compatriot’s 
hour of need. Their Sri Lankan counterparts were not only able to communicate with 
fellow aid workers in a ‘technical’ language of local people’s needs, but also capable of 
empathising and relating to their concerns (Fernando 2009; Ganesan 2006, 2011; Gilbert 
2005). As warned by Bruner (1986), the anthropology of experience has often been 
dismissed as hermeneutics, since people frequently communicate their feelings and 
experiences using verbal or body language. However, by understanding how local 
communities operate, it is possible that these expressions are interpreted as experiences 
in their entirety. In addition, culturally bound syndromes and non-communicable 
phenomena can also be better understood through culturally informed mental health 
personnel.  
Tsunami survivors who undertook mental health policies that were deliberative 
and inclusive thought their time spent was useful in relieving mental anguish. In 
describing the role of the cultural psychiatrist, Fernando (2004:109, 2012) argues that 
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combining the emic – local religious and social values – and the etic – Western psychiatric 
and psychosocial methods – together is the ideal method for mental health interventions 
in developing countries. Instead of deploying impartial, single debriefing sessions as 
proposed by American therapists Watters (2010) interviewed, culturally informed 
continuous assessments with empathy and the ability to listen were more likely to be 
effective in determining the causes of mental anguish. The tsunami survivors considered 
the process as one about building personal ties and ‘getting to know [them]’ instead of a 
psychiatric version of a full body examination: invasive, impersonal and often ineffective 
(Fernando 2009:109). This has parallels with Cornwall’s (2004:87) exposition of ‘invited 
spaces’ that suggests a shift towards more inclusive participatory projects, where 
participants are able to set their own parameters and subsequently have greater autonomy 
in expressing their thoughts and experiences. Fernando (2009) enquired with a local 
Catholic parish priest in selecting group therapy participants in Batticaloa. When the 
participants were informed of Fernando’s (2009) Sinhalese roots and project aims, they 
felt privileged and comfortable to share their recollections with someone who understood 
their tribulations and socio-cultural values. Whenever labels and definitions are 
established, they must be done so in a collaborative manner where both development 
practitioners and local communities are equally aware of the implications of their actions 
and accept them.  
In particular, group therapy sessions that fostered a sense of belonging and 
welcoming sentiments were likely to encourage participants to discuss their feelings and 
experiences more openly. The benefits of group-based psychosocial treatment have been 
documented in other instances:  Johnstone (2007; cited in Fernando 2009:5) observed that 
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relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina involved group therapy sessions, which strengthened 
bonds between relief work volunteers and the survivors, while enhancing ties within each 
group as well. Fernando (2009) discusses the benefits of group work by citing her 
experiences working with female Sri Lankan survivors of the tsunami:  
In the final session, I asked members about their group time together and what it meant, 
including what lessons members had learned about themselves, from each other, and from the 
group as a whole. … When asked how it felt to help one another, they reported that it felt good, 
and that they never thought they had it in them to help another because of the assumption that 
they had nothing to offer to others. They believed they were too focused on themselves and their 
suffering (Fernando 2009:11). 
Considering that many of the group therapy participants had lost family members, 
through their peers they were able to devise a ‘new’ kin group. Furthermore, this 
particular group therapy session encouraged people to express how they experienced the 
tsunami through their emotions and speech, thus reaffirming Jackson’s (1998, 2005) 
definition of life as a process through which people guide themselves. As Gilbert (2005) 
argues, the most important thing a development practitioner must have is empathy and 
the ability to listen to different perspectives. Despite their material losses, by evoking a 
sense of collectivism ingrained in various Sri Lankan customs as a means to support each 
other in their times of need, the survivors left the group sessions feeling much more stable. 
They found one of many new purposes in their lives: listening to fellow tsunami survivors’ 
concerns, while having their own grievances heard. It is not my intention to present group 
therapy as a panacea, but rather a mental health policy model that can be effective subject 
to certain conditions being met.  
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The Bigger Picture: Incorporating ‘Inclusiveness’ into Reforms 
 In light of the tsunami and its aftermath, the Sri Lankan government in 2005 
announced a ten-year plan dedicated towards improving access to mental health facilities 
and training more professionals. Given the lack of trained psychiatrists and psychologists 
in areas heavily affected by the tsunami, the government decided to take action by 
establishing more clinics and training more mental health personnel, ranging from 
counsellors to psychiatrists (Fernando 2005; Ganesan 2006, 2011). Combining the 
decades of trauma and anguish suffered from the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict and the 
tsunami, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Health estimated that up to 2% of the population 
suffered from some form of behavioural disorder (Sri Lankan Ministry of Health 2005:1). 
In response, the Ministry’s 2005-2015 Mental Health Plan announced broad reforms such 
as having at least two counsellors for all health districts, refurbishing existing mental 
health facilities and establishing a National Institute of Mental Health to train mental 
health professionals and conduct research (Sri Lankan Ministry of Health 2005; WHO 
2013). Having witnessed international NGOs’ psychosocial interventions and the 
consequences of being inadequately prepared for addressing people’s mental anguish 
after natural or manmade disasters, the Sri Lankan government announced a framework 
towards formalising and expanding mental health treatments across the country.  
 However, whether such reforms have been focusing on simply increasing 
facilities and the number of trained psychiatric professionals, or if they involve genuine 
attempts at incorporating people’s experiences of mental distress remains to be seen. A 
WHO (2013:76) report claims that the Ministry of Health’s 2005-2015 Plan focuses on 
decentralised community-based care systems. It also illustrates increasing access to 
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mental health assistance across the country from 2004 to 2013 with additional 
intermediate care units, psychiatry inpatient units and community outreach clinics being 
built through the 2005-2015 Plan; districts that were affected the most from the tsunami 
were some of the first ones to receive such comprehensive coverage (WHO 2013:77). 
Despite such publications announcing a successful transformation of mental health policy 
in Sri Lanka, neither the Ministry of Health’s (2005) plan nor the WHO (2013) report 
discuss in detail how community counselling takes place. Although the plan mentions 
follow-up treatments to monitor people’s mental stability over medium/long-term periods 
and district-level mental health plans being formulated in conjunction with the national 
government (Sri Lankan Ministry of Health 2005:4), whether the counsellors are qualified 
psychologists, psychiatrists or what forms of therapeutic methods they will use are left 
undiscussed. Furthermore, while the report mentions increased regulation of psychotropic 
drugs, it does not provide a mechanism for such measures (Sri Lankan Ministry of Health 
2005:2). Despite increasing physical and manpower capacities of mental health facilities, 
whether the interventions themselves will be inclusive and focus on the patient’s socio-
cultural as well as physical body remains unanswered.  
 
The suspicions raised in the previous paragraph stem from a phenomenon not 
exclusive to Sri Lanka: policymakers’ detached lives in relation to the wider community. 
Argenti-Pillen’s (2003a) examination of the ‘Cinnamon Gardens,’ a network of 
international humanitarian and aid NGOs and executives in Sri Lanka, showed several 
contentious aspects of their behaviour. Sinhala is an expressive language with multiple 
ways to describe ideas that are expressed using one word in English. However, most of 
the translations of Western medical concepts such  as ‘occupational therapy’ and ‘pity’ 
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stem from ‘Colombo-style Sinhala,’ which is almost exclusively spoken by the Sri 
Lankan elite (Argenti-Pillen 2003a:194-195). Considering that the most of the severely 
tsunami-affected areas had a Tamil majority whose mother tongue is not Sinhala, primary 
religion is not Buddhist and consults multiple sources of medical advice, culturally 
inappropriate translations of various mental distresses were not uncommon (Argenti-
Pillen 2003a; Kuhn 2010:44-45). Argenti-Pillen’s (2003a) observations largely confirm 
Harper’s (2011) examination of their Nepalese counterparts who live in gated 
communities, communicate almost exclusively in English and are detached from 
Nepalese everyday life. When health personnel are detached from their clients’ lives and 
are unable to empathise and understand their situations, it is somewhat unsurprising that 
they have been unable to achieve their objectives regarding something as subjective as 
mental health. International health professionals’ inability to communicate with their 
neighbours, as noted above, is detrimental towards creating effective mental health 
policies.  
Furthermore, despite the 2005-2015 Mental Health Plan showing potential 
towards reforms, the Sri Lankan government’s commitment towards future plans remains 
doubtful. As Higginbotham (1984) states, ‘national will’ towards mental health funding 
remains low not only among governments, but also private medical firms that operate on 
a national level. This has been argued for by the WHO (2010), whose report revealed that 
25% and 40% of all surveyed countries respectively have no legislative measures or 
policies to address the increasing incidence of mental illnesses; consequently, an 
argument based on ‘political will’ can be made (WHO 2010). In 2008, the Sri Lankan 
government allocated 1.32% of its national health budget towards three mental hospitals; 
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considering that up to 3% of the Sri Lankan population were estimated to be suffering 
some form of mental anguish, there is a discrepancy in funding for mental health (Kitsiri 
2009:23; WHO 2008: cited in Kitsiri 2009:9). In response, Reich (1994) proposes 
examining the political feasibility of public health projects, as this would enable political 
cost/benefit analyses to be conducted. Such calculations explain how politicians are 
incentivised to prioritise certain policies over others; in other words, mere ‘political will’ 
cannot persuade others to change their opinions on mental health, but political incentives 
can (Reich 1994). In any case, what remains clear is a comparatively smaller funding 
allocation towards mental health in Sri Lanka compared to other maladies, raising 
questions on the feasibility of maintaining the momentum gathered from the 2005-2015 
Mental Health Plan. 
As a result, participatory development projects must be underpinned by political 
reforms and promotions of people’s rights through citizenship, so that local communities 
act on their own volition towards policy reforms. Hickey and Mohan (2004a, 2004b, 
2004c) propose a ‘radical politics of development’ that will modify participation from its 
tyrannical ways as argued by Kothari (2001). Participation must be perceived as a part of 
a citizen’s rights, followed by incorporating participatory measures into broader political 
reform programmes that aim to re-engage ‘the technocratic expression of participation 
with one of its more theoretical, political and radical antecedents’ (Hickey and Mohan 
2005:245). Through integrating participation with citizenship, it becomes redefined as a 
‘right’ to which everyone is entitled, serving as an example of individual agency in the 
political realm (Lister 1998:228, cited in Gaventa 2004:29). Applying this to a mental 
health context would imply that access to deliberative, non-paternalistic mental 
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healthcare must be defined as a ‘right’ that people are able to request to the government 
based on their citizenship and must be lobbied for accordingly. This is undertaken by 
external non-state actors or communities mobilising themselves on their own to engage 
with politicians and provide incentives for policymakers to take action (Hickey and 
Mohan 2004b, 2004c; Reich 1994). Put succinctly, mental health policies must be 
‘anchored’ by overarching reforms taking place, which are being promulgated by local 
communities through collaborative, deliberative processes towards political change. I am 
not suggesting that non-state actor presence and supporting the mobilisation of local 
communities in political engagement are panaceas, but rather that they are suitable 
starting points towards instigating inclusive participatory development. 
However, such conceptualisations of people’s experiences need substantiated 
action; this is where non-state actors can contribute towards ensuring dialogue between 
communities and governments remain inclusive for local citizens to express their views. 
Campbell and Burgess (2012) emphasise the need for establishing a mutual understanding 
of mental health between development and mental health practitioners and local 
communities. In spite of such inclusive rhetoric, they however do not propose any specific 
examples through which mental health projects can avoid reproducing past failures. 
Similarly, Fernando (2012) recommends initiatives such as creating the ‘language’ of 
GMH beyond its usual rhetoric of ‘scaling-up’ policies and linking psychiatric research 
with aid donor interests, the article also does not explain how her suggestions can be 
implemented effectively. While NGOs such as BasicNeeds have engaged with local 
communities towards raising awareness of mental illnesses, the message they transmit 
has had little consultation from local communities. Furthermore, the messages are often 
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left unquestioned on the grounds of BasicNeeds’ knowledge coming from Western 
psychiatry, which is deemed to be modern and therefore superior (Mills 2014:60-69). 
Although no universally applicable examples of models to balance state and non-state 
actors currently exist, when its preconditions such as an equilibrium of power and voice 
in the space of participation are attained, they can lead to benefits such as greater political 
representation, starting new inter-class and institutional ties and creating ‘town hall’ 
sessions for local villagers to hold politicians accountable (Gaventa 2004; Williams 
2004:99-100). Provided NGOs and local community leaders can maintain the delicate 
balance between inclusive and closed spaces for discussion, participatory development 
has the potential to incorporate local insights in places where they matter, such as 
policymaking. 
 Finally, participatory practices claiming to be inclusive must be capable of 
questioning its methods and assumptions. Self-reflexivity, like many other social sciences 
concepts, is hard to define specifically. Generally speaking, it involves ‘a scientific 
inquiry also being the subjects who carry out the inquiry’ (Flanagan 1981:375). This is 
similar to what Bourdieu (2003:282) proposes as ‘participant objectivation,’ which takes 
into account ‘the social conditions of the production of these pre-constructions and of the 
social agents who produce them.’ Self-reflexive practices should be undertaken by all 
development practitioners and academics, as ‘the capacity to listen to the person in need 
in his/her full social, economic, and political context’ provides the foundations for 
‘internal observers’ Gilbert (2005:64). The internal observer is able to distinguish where 
his/her ‘biases’ affect what kind of knowledge – official or informal – to utilise in their 
interactions with fellow development practitioners and local communities, paying 
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attention in particular to how they express experiences through speech or emotions. This 
is achieved through considering – or ‘listening to’ – what kinds of knowledge are being 
transmitted by the development agency to its employees, after which the employees 
themselves decide a suitable course of action (Gilbert 2005; Tamas 2007). When physical 
sites of participation are established, policymakers must consider how the social spaces 
of participation operate. After all, social spaces are never ‘neutral’ and this point must be 
constantly reminded to Western or local bureaucratic organisations and local 
communities (Cornwall 2004; Gaventa 2004:34-35; Williams 2004). While development 
practitioners cannot ‘bracket’ – the act of suspending judgement stemming from a certain 
branch of thinking (Desjarlais and Throop 2011) – their socio-cultural and educational 
influences completely, they can at least acknowledge their influences and take heed 
whenever necessary. 
Conclusion 
 Through reconsidering participatory development from a citizenship-based 
perspective and applying it to mental health interventions, the importance of people’s 
experiences is emphasised. When people who were previously excluded are brought into 
a space of participation and inclusion, vested interests of development practitioners or 
village elites could play a role. However, through focusing on group therapy, empathy 
and common socio-cultural background, participatory development can take a different 
course. A balanced emic-etic framework for not just mental health, but also development 
policy in general harnesses the best of both worlds: local perspectives that illustrate 
historically and currently significant factors in everyday life are combined with the 
material and economic expertise of development practitioners. By considering people’s 
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recollections as something beyond ‘symptoms’ of a phenomena but as phenomena 
themselves, what Cornwall (2004) proposes to be an ‘inclusive’ space is created, as their 
recollections are not treated paternalistically, but on equal footing as peers helping one 
another out. Such ideas have already been covered by Campbell and Burgess (2012) and 
Fernando (2012); however, given participatory development’s reputation as a mere 
façade of inclusiveness, they must be substantiated by self-reflexive behaviour, while 
promoting political engagement as a starting point to implement inclusive, effective 
mental health policies and raise awareness of the issues. Local-level interventions must 
be integrated into wider socio-political reforms through encouraging discussions and 
collaborations. In particular, such processes can pave the way towards institutions that 
measure the accountability and transparency of development practitioners, focusing in 
particular on conceptualising and promoting non-paternalistic mental health treatment as 
a right for all Sri Lankan citizens.  
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Conclusion 
 Mental health interventions in developing countries, despite well-intended actions 
of Western development agencies, have failed to achieve their objective of completely 
reducing short-run mental anguish in Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami. A poorly 
coordinated and overly competitive international non-government organisation (NGO) 
sector led to a lack of specialisation and identifying local material and medical needs. 
While projects involving material assistance involved local input, certain mental health 
policies involved no consultation, on the grounds of universalist assumptions regarding 
mental suffering. Critiques regarding the seemingly apolitical nature of development 
policies that in fact often espouse vested interests are not uncommon. I have shown in 
Chapters 1 and 2 that mental health policies in an aid & development context are no 
exceptions to the generalisation stated above; Western psychiatry’s grounds for 
legitimacy stems from a materialist approach towards understanding human suffering, 
influenced by the mind-body Cartesian duality. Despite the fact that many have critiqued 
the arbitrary nature of categorising the mind and the body as such – two distinct, disjoint 
entities – it continues to be influential and widely used in psychiatry and biomedical 
practice. In 2004, Sri Lanka was struck by two tsunamis: one on Boxing Day and another 
one involving misguided, culturally insensitive and paternalistic mental health policies.  
Chapter 2 was an exercise in ‘blurring’ the Cartesian duality to highlight how 
bodies are not mere physical subjects, but also socio-political entities capable of 
embodying and exerting agency. The ambivalent nature of ‘mental health’ also remains 
difficult to resolve; the notion of embodiment, stemming from phenomenology, offers 
some alternatives. Despite attempts to move beyond the Cartesian mind-body duality, the 
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differentiation made between ‘suffering’ and ‘illness’ and making a case for including the 
‘mind’ into medical analysis only reinforces the disjointed nature of understanding human 
beings (Leder 1984, 1992; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987). Instead, by examining the 
human body as the ‘lived-body’ – a sum of its senses, movements, experiences and 
behavioural patterns – a complete picture of the patient’s life is created beyond their 
bodily organs (Leder 1992:33). Emotions serve as an example of the mind-body duality 
being blurred, where expressions of anxiety or anger are associated with faster breaths 
being taken, while calmness is often conveyed through a steady pace (Lyon 1997). 
Moving beyond Foucault’s (1963) clinical gaze to treat human anguish as it is, instead of 
relying on the Cartesian duality, is a step that remains to be taken by mental health 
professionals. Critiqued by many but still utilised by many others, the mind-body 
distinction and its descendent – Western psychiatry – leaves more questions than answers 
when attempting to explain ‘mental’ health.  
In Chapter 3, I highlighted community-based group therapy as a means towards 
breaking through the so-called ‘tyranny’ of participatory development, but I also 
cautioned its usage in an apolitical, culturally ‘neutral’ stance. The problems identified 
with the Cartesian duality in Chapter 2 resemble the issues participatory development 
faces: despite its intentions towards a more inclusive, collaborative development 
policymaking, it has been manipulated, unwittingly or wittingly, by development 
agencies under an ‘apolitical, technical’ veneer. There has already been rhetoric that 
proposes for more ‘inclusive’ participatory development processes, but with little 
applicability and concrete examples (Chambers 1994; Cornwall 2004; Hickey and Mohan 
2004c). Consequently, collaborative, non-paternalistic mental health facilities must be 
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treated as a right founded on citizenship. In other words, people must campaign towards 
inclusive mental health policies as a universal right that protects people’s wellbeing, 
eventually leading to institutions that monitor state and non-state actors’ actions for the 
local community. Citizens then are inspired to take action, promoting access to mental 
health facilities as a citizenship right. Therefore, rhetoric must be affixed to and run 
concurrently alongside overarching development policy and government reforms, so that 
politicians are incentivised and held accountable (Gaventa 2004; Hickey and Mohan 
2004a, 2004c). Participatory development, despite the amount of criticism it has endured, 
still has some useful features. Its aims towards incorporating local perspectives can be 
achieved by fostering an environment where people’s experiences are valued and 
implemented, through amalgamating them into broader political movements as a starting 
point. 
Merging the three strands of participatory development, phenomenologically-
informed anthropology and psychiatry creates a useful framework in examining mental 
health policies in developing countries. Given the anthropology of experience and 
embodiment’s focus on understanding the world as it is without predispositions, 
psychiatry’s examinations of the human mind and participatory development’s intentions 
towards inclusive, deliberative development projects, the three disciplines cover each 
other’s limitations while providing a different approach towards understanding an 
increasingly pertinent topic: mental health in developing countries. The subjective nature 
of mental illness and suffering suggests embodiment is well-suited towards explaining 
why past and present mental health policies based on a biomedical-centric understanding 
of human suffering failed to achieve their objectives (Aho 2008; Leder 1984; Fernando 
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2005, 2009; Ganesan 2006, 2011). There is more to human anguish than a pill – such 
initiatives represent misguided applications of reductionism that omit socio-cultural and 
personal implications (Li 2007; Mills 2014). Through examining mental health policies 
in developing countries using lenses such as embodiment and community-based political 
reforms, focusing in particular on people’s experiences and rights from citizenship, 
participatory development can take a different meaning. In particular, initiatives to create 
a space of dialogue – one which is often non-neutral (Cornwall 2004) – that is more 
‘inclusive’ can take a different meaning by encouraging people to express their 
experiences in a culturally appropriate manner so that their voices are heard through 
political engagement.  
Future Avenues of Research 
New areas of research could involve devising a substantiative framework to 
conduct mental health policies through an experiential, embodied and rights-based 
approach that integrates local perspectives towards mental distress with Western 
psychiatric methods in developing countries. Due to the interconnected nature between 
emotions and mental distress, examining ways to incorporate emotional experiences more 
effectively through participatory development or other methods could help address 
mental health issues (Lyon and Barbalet 1994; Lyon 1997). However, fieldwork is needed 
to find specific examples of treating mental health as a right through ‘participatory 
citizenship.’ While I have suggested that mental health policy should stem from local 
political engagement and mobilising villagers to raise awareness of mental health by 
using Hickey and Mohan’s (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005) framework, Gaventa (2004) 
points out that conditions for effective participatory governance vary for all locations and 
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situations. In this thesis I interpreted group therapy sessions in Sri Lanka using the 
concept of embodiment and suggested them as an example of inclusive and culturally 
sensitive mental health treatment. However, empirical evidence gathered from fieldwork 
is needed to better explain how group-based treatments evoking emotions can help 
alleviate mental anguish and how such processes can take place under the auspices of 
citizenship and rights. 
Another area to examine is the relationship between pharmaceutical companies 
and mental health professionals in developing countries. I hinted at some existing 
correlations in the Introduction and Chapter 2 such as the question of why psychiatrists 
and psychiatry-influenced mental health interventions are still preferred by development 
and aid agencies, the increasing usage of antidepressants in India using Mills (2014) and 
Ecks and Basu’s (2009) case studies and the rise of MGMH. However, explicit casual 
relations are yet to be established. As mental health in developing countries starts to gain 
more attention, signs – be they subversive or explicit – of pharmaceutical companies 
aiming to prioritise profit over people’s wellbeing in developing countries must be 
enquired upon promptly. Mills’ (2014) approach grounded on colonial discourse explains 
the one-sided nature of mental health interventions conducted by India-based NGOs 
effectively, but it could equally be considered as an overly deterministic reading of the 
situation. One possible conceptual framework that could be used is to examine developing 
countries’ access to psychotropic medication from a security background – in other words, 
the securitisation of pharmaceuticals in developing countries.  
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